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Absolute Preferences in Municipal Civil Service 
Appointments: The Unresolved Conflict 
With Municipal Discretion 
State legislatures have enacted civil service laws applicable to 
municipalities in order to ensure that local governments provide 
optimum services to their citizens.1 To achieve this objective, the 
laws restrict eligibility for public service positions to persons of 
proven qualifications. Although these statutes provide general 
guidelines for municipal employment procedures, final decisions as 
to the actual hiring of employees are generally left to the 
municipalities. This practice recognizes the advantages of permitting 
local officials who are intimately acquainted with the demands of 
government work in their particular localities to select employees at 
their own discretion.2 However, it has been deemed appropriate in 
certain situations to eliminate choice in the selection process and to 
entitle persons with specified qualifications to be appointed as a 
matter of right. These preferences are designed to effectuate objec-
tives supplemental to, or independent of, traditional civil service 
policies. Although the use of such "absolute preferences" is subject 
to forceful criticism,3 this comment is predicated upon the realization 
that the use of such preferences in one form or another represents 
an established practice in a majority of the states. This study will 
attempt to delineate the historical bases and current prevalence of 
absolute preferences, describe the various types of preferences cur-
rently in force, discuss the means available of enforcing them, and 
suggest revisions necessary to effectuate their objectives. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Eighty years ago the hiring and firing of subordinate public offi-
cials was subject to the plenary control of the chief executive of the 
municipality. The result was a "spoils system" of public employment, 
under which jobs were granted in return for political favors4-a 
practice which greatly impaired the efficiency and quality of public 
service, since in ~any instances those employed by the government 
were wholly unqualified. Job assignments were frequently in no way 
correlated with the particular competence of individuals. In addi-
tion, a disruption of the entire public service inevitably occurred 
when a newly elected official took office and replaced the partisans of 
1. Turner v. Denver, 146 Colo. 336, 361 P.2d 631 (1961). 
2. See notes 24-26 infra and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Gladieux, Civil Service Versus Merit, 12 PUB, ADMIN. REv.-173, 176 (1952); 
Weintraub 8: Tough, Veterans Preferred, Unlimite_d, 34 NAT'L MuNic. REv. 437 (1945). 
See generally Kaplan, Civil Service 75 Years, 47 NAT'L CMC REv. 220 (1958). 
4. Keith v. Beasley, 177 Tenn. ~52, 152 S.W.2d 618-(1941), quoting from IO.AM, Jtm. 
Civil Service § 2, at 921-22 (1938); see 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Service § 1 (1964). 
(891] 
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the former official with his own supporters.15 Furthermore, the system 
severely limited the· supply of qualified workers for public service 
positions, because most qualified persons were reluctant to allow 
their job security to depend upon another's political fortunes. Fi-
nally, extravagance resulted from the creation by elected officials of 
unnecessary jobs to offer as rewards for political fidelity.0 It was the 
need to remedy these defects inherent in the spoils system which led 
to the enactment of civil service laws.7 · 
The basic reform provided by the civil service laws was to place 
the hiring of employees on the basis of merit. Under the merit sys-
tem, open competitive examinations are used to establish a list of 
persons qualified for each job classification,8 and appointment to the 
position is limited to these qualified persons. A corollary reform was 
the enactment of tenure provisions, which protect an employee's job 
security by prohibiting dismissal without cause and by providing a 
hearing to examine the validity of the alleged "good cause" when an 
employee is dismissed.9 These desirable employment practices have 
been effectuated by the establishment of civil servic~ commissions to 
eliminate the arbitrary control of public employment by individuals. 
The typical procedural method of carrying into effect the merit 
policies of civil service laws is illustrated by the Pennsylvania statute 
providing a municipal civil service system for police.10 The statute 
provides for. the establishment of a three-member local civil service 
commission11 empowered to prescribe, amend, and enforce regula-
tions for implementation of the act.12 In implementing state merit 
5. Mitchell, Merit Versus Spoils in Public Employment, 22 NAT'L MuNIC. REv. 492 
(1933). . 
6. See King, Political Patronage Threatens Democracy, 22 NAT'L MuNic. REv. 496 
(1933). 
7. For some interesting expressions on the value of and need for political patronage 
in the hiring of municipal employees, see BANFIELD &: WILSON, CITY POLITICS 207•12 
(1963); Flynn, How the Spoils System Works, in URBAN GOVERNMENT (Banfield ed. 1961). 
But see Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 PUB, AnMIN, REV, 28 (1960), 
Sorauf argues that the formerly practical uses of political patronage no longer exist in 
modem government because of economic and political changes. See also King, supra 
note 6. · 
8. For purposes of administration there are general classifications of jobs according 
to skills and aptitudes measurable by examination. Under each classification there are 
usually many jobs the qualified applicant can fill. Of course, in certain instances this 
is not true, since such positions as those of firemen and policemen cannot readily be 
classified with any other job. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 88.412 (1948). 
9. 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Service § 38 (1964). See note 71 infra and accompanying 
text. For discussion of various statutory provisions, see Agger, The Government and 
Its Employees, 47 YALE L.J. 1109, 1114-20 (1938) (federal employees); Joelson, Legal 
Problems in the Dismissal of Civil Servants in the United States, Britain, and France, 
12 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1963); Comment, 23 LA. L. REv. 121 (1962) (Louisiana state 
employees). See also 35 WASH. L. REv. 220 (1960), suggesting a constitutional due• 
process right against arbitrary dismissal. 
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 53251-77 (1957). 
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.. 53, § 53252 (1957). 
12. PA: STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53256 (1957). 
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policies for appointments, the civil service commission is initially em-
powered to preclude certain applicants from taking the qualifying 
examination if they fail to meet certain physical and moral stan-
dards.13 Those who meet the initial standards for qualification are 
then given an examination, which must be "practical in character 
and . . . relate to such matters and include such inquiries as will 
fairly test the merit and fitness of the persons examined to discharge 
the duties of the employment sought by them."14 
On the basis of the results of the examination, it is determined 
that those meeting a prescribed minimum standard15 are capable of 
performing the duties of a police officer, and they are listed as quali-
fied for appointment.16 Upon notification by the municipal appoint-
ing power17 of a vacancy to be filled, the commission certifies as 
eligible for appointment the three persons standing highest on the 
list of qualified applicants.18 In order to be certified,19 an applicant 
must have attained his position on the list through an examination 
held within a one-year period preceding the request for certifica-
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53263 (1957). Under this section, the civil service com-
mission can refuse to examine someone if he is (1) physically unfit for the job, (2) ad-
dicted to the use of intoxicating liquors or drugs, (3) guilty of having committed any 
crime involving moral turpitude, (4) guilty of infamous, notorious, or disgraceful con-
duct, (5) affiliated with any subversive group, or if he has previously been dismissed 
from public service for delinquency or misconduct in office. See note 33 infra and 
accompanying text. 
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53261 (1957). 
15. The applicant is generally required to achieve a certain score, such as 70%, to 
pass the examination. E.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 50; OHIO R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 143.17 
(Page Supp. 1964). However, the standard for passing an examination may be lowered 
after the examination has been given if it appears that without a lowering of the 
standard there would be an insufficient number of persons eligible for appointment. 
Doe v. Lang, 47 Misc. 2d 182, 261 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1965). But see Poss v. Kem, 263 
App. Div. 320, 32 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1942) (insufficient number of eligible applicants deemed 
inadequate reason for declaring eligible certain persons not attaining required score on 
examination). 
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53261 (1957). 
17. Under this Pennsylvania statute the appointing power is the borough council. 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53252 (1957). In many states the department head is empowered 
to make the appointments within the department. ALA. CODE .AFP. § 1222 (1958) (chief 
of police or fire department); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-14 (1963). N.Y. C1v. SERV. 
LAW § 2 defines appointing authority as "the officer, commission or body having the 
power of appointment to subordinate positions." See also notes 31-32 infra and accom-
panying text for a discussion of a Texas statute providing for a splitting of the 
responsibility for appointments. TEX. R.Ev. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (1963). 
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53264 (1957). When there is more than one vacancy to 
be filled, the act provides that three persons are to be certified for each vacancy to be 
filled. Other states provide different means for filling more than one vacancy. In Ohio, 
the positions are filled one at a time from the top three eligibles; thus, the two appli-
cants not appointed to the first position are eligible, along with the fourth highest 
applicant, for appointment to the second position. OHio R.Ev. CODE ANN, § 143.20 (Page 
Supp. 1964). Some states provide that one additional applicant be certified for each 
additional vacancy-a method which is similar in effect to the Ohio provision. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE AFP. § 662 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 36-4-26 (1956). 
19. An applicant is "certified" when the civil service commission informs the ap-
pointing authority that he may be appointed. · 
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tion.20 After three such persons have been certified by the commis-
sion, the appointing authority can fill the vacancy only by appointing 
one of them. 21 
Statutes similar to that of Pennsylvania have consistently been 
upheld as a valid exercise of state power.22 One justification is the 
interest of the state in benefiting its citizens by increasing the effi-
ciency of public service throughout the state. Furthermore, since the 
state is the source of municipal power, civil service laws can be justi-
fied as an exercise of the state's plenary power over municipalities.23 
Nevertheless, the states have traditionally avoided placing restrictions 
on municipal discretion in civil service appointments, recognizing 
that the greater concern and responsibility regarding appointments 
rests with the municipality, and that examinations cannot disclose all 
relevant aspects of an applicant's qualifications for employment.24 
Indeed, many statutes specifically provide that the appointing au-
thority be afforded a choice in making every appointment.26 By 
allowing a choice among various applicants, states have avoided re-
strictions which might prove disadvantageous to a department head 
attempting to appoint subordinate personnel with particular quali-
ties which, although incapable of measurement on the examination, 
increase the applicants' suitability for the position.26 
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53264 (1957). The duration of the validity of lists of 
eligible applicants is generally limited, although the period of validity varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, N.Y. Crv. SERv. I.Aw § 56 authorizes a dura• 
tion of not less than one year nor more than four years, while N.J. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11:9•10 (1960) authorizes a period of six months to three years. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 31, § 12 (Supp. 1964), on the other hand, specifically limits duration to two years. 
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53264 (1957). 
22. State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N.W. 832 (1911). Since there is no 
unqualified right of persons to enter the public service and since holding public office 
is considered a privilege, it is proper for the state to place reasonable conditions upon 
the enjoyment of that privilege. 
23. "[Under] American constitutional law ••• the state legislature is possessed of 
all legislative power except as its exercise is prohibited by the federal or state constitu• 
tions .••• [T]he power of the legislature over municipal corporations is plenary. It has 
the power to create and the power to destroy •••• " Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal 
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 646•47 (1964). 
In view of this plenary power of the state, courts generally regard municipalities as 
agents of the state administering only such state affairs as to which they are expressly 
authorized to act. Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 437, 134 So. 205, 207-08 
(1931); Lang v. City of Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 84, 228 N.W. 819, 822 (1930). 
24. See Kaplan, Local Autonomy and the Merit System, 6 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL 
Gov'T 289, 290 (1941). Sec also Gladieux, Civil Service Versus Merit, 12 Pun. ADMIN. REv. 
173 (1952), discussing the desirability of discretion in the federal appointment process. 
25. A.LA. CODE APP. § 662 (1958) (three persons eligible and available for appoint• 
ment); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19057; CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 5-38 (Supp. 1963); LA. R.Ev. 
STAT. § 33-2416 (1950) (three persons eligible and willing to accept employment); N.Y. 
CIV. SERv. LAw § 61 (three persons eligible and willing to accept employment). 
26. The Pennsylvania police civil service statutes (see text accompanying notes 10-21 
supra) provide that the appointing authority may appoint any one of the top three 
eligible applicants on the list but do not provide for the situation where these appli• 
cants arc unavailable or unwilling to accept. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53264 (1957). 
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Some states have avoided any direct restrictions on the discretion 
of the local appointing authority by adopting a general enabling 
statute empowering the municipality to provide its own civil service 
system.27 However, this device has sometimes resulted in the muni-
cipality itself limiting the choice of the appointing authority by im-
posing certain absolute preferences.28 
Despite the factors justifying a degree of municipal discretion, 
states have remained alert to the dangers of too much discretion. For 
instance, some states have prohibited discriminatory exclusions of 
individuals29 based on race, religion, or political affiliation.30 In some 
states, provisions have been enacted which seek, through division of 
responsibility for appointments, to prevent the discrimination result-
ing from an appointing officer's personal dislike for an applicant for 
a position under the immediate supervision of the appointing officer. 
For example, under the Texas statute providing a civil service system 
for local police, the appropriate department head determines that an 
appointment should be made, but it is the mayor who then makes the 
appointment.31 It might be argued that this procedure could result in 
a relapse to the spoils system, since the person most able to use poli-
tical patronage to his advantage is empowered to make the appoint-
ment. In addition, such a procedure may simply shift the opportunity 
for discrimination in the making of appointments from the depart-
ment head to the mayor. However, since the person standing highest 
on the list is entitled to an absolute preference under the Texas 
statute, it would seem probable that the mayor will automatically 
make the required appointment rather than risk possible repercus-
sions with the civil service commission or the local electorate.32 Dis-
27. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§ 45000-01. 
28. See Balff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 2d 211, 110 P .2d 478 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1941); State ex rel. Raines v. Seattle, 134 Wash. 360, 235 P. 968 (1925). 
29. Even though an arbitrary exclusion of individuals is generally prohibited, 
certain states have provisions which appear to make such an exclusion possible. These 
states provide by statute that a person may be removed from the list of eligible persons 
if he is not appointed after being certified the same number of times as there are names 
certified for each vacancy. That is, in a state where three names are certified to the 
appointing authority in response to its request, an individual's name may be removed 
from the list after he has been certified three times. ALA. CoDE MP. § 662 (1958); KY. 
REv. STAT. § 90.170 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. § 33-2416 (1950); WIS. STAT. § 16.18 (1963). 
It is reasoned that an applicant who has been passed over three times does not meet 
the discretionary requirements of the appointing authority and should not remain 
eligible. However, the provisions may be used as a device to avoid appointing an 
applicant for unjustified reasons. Since the act of appointment from among the top 
three on the list is discretionary, there is no basis for the applicant to challenge his 
non-appointment. 
30. E.g., ALA. CODE MP. § 669 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53273 (1957); WIS. 
STAT. § 16.14 (1963). 
31. True. R.Ev. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 10 (1963). 
32. See Sorauf, supra note 7, at 30, noting the disinclination of voters to support 
a candidate suspected of exercising the powers of -his office in return for favors from 
constituents. 
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crimination at the examining level has also been attacked by provid-
ing in the statute an exclusive list of reasons justifying a refusal by 
the civil service commission to examine or certify a particular 
applicant.33 
Rather than being considered an undue restriction on municipal 
discretion, civil service laws are generally said merely to prescribe the 
limits within which such discretion may be exercised.84 Absolute 
preferences may be regarded as merely a further limitation of this 
discretion, since they eliminate the choice of whom to appoint, but 
do not impair the municipality's decisions concerning whether and 
when to make appointments. 
I!. TYPES OF ABSOLUTE PREFERENCES 
A. Preference for Applicant With Highest Score 
The most basic type of absolute preference requires the appoint-
ment of the person with the highest score on the examination. How-
ever, such a preference is uncommon; only one state, Illinois, 35 re-
quires that all local civil service appointments be of the highest 
scorer on the list of eligible applicants,36 while seven states require 
the appointment of the top eligible applicant for the position of fire-
man or policeman.87 The latter states generally recognize the value 
33. E.g., ALA. CODE APP. § 660 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53263 (1957); WIS. 
STAT. § 16.13 (1963). See note 13 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
34. Bragdon v. Ries, 346 Pa. 10, 29 A.2d 40 (1943). 
35. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-14 (1963). Compare People ex rel. Beardsley v. 
Harl, 109 Colo. 223, 124 P.2d 233 (1942); CoLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13, as interpreted 
in Schmidt v. Hurst, 109 Colo. 207, 124 P.2d 235 (1942). The Colorado Constitution 
requires that all appointments in the civil service of the state shall be of the appli-
cant with the highest test score. However, Colorado has no state law covering local 
civil service. 
36. The "rule of one" has met with some disfavor, as evidenced by the fact that 
various states have repealed provisions requiring appointment of the first on the list, 
in favor of allowing the appointing power a choice. See Ark. Acts 1937, No. 322, § ll, 
at 1226, as amended by Ark. Acts 1959, No. 464, § 1, at 1838 (now ARK, STAT. ANN, 
§ 19-1303 (Supp. 1965)); Ark. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 3, at 65, as amended by Ark. Acts 
1959, No. 205, § 1, at 1121 (now ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-1603 (Supp. 1965)); R.I. Laws 
1939, ch. 661, § 12, as amended by R.I. Laws 1941, ch. 1050, § 8 to provide a "rule of 
three," as amended by R.I. Laws 1955, ch. 3527, § 1 to provide the present "rule of six" 
(now R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 36-4-26 (1956)). · 
The "rule of one" has met disfavor in Colorado (see note 35 supra) where two 
attempts at a constitutional amendment have failed. See 49 NAT'L C1v1c REv. 252 (1960). 
Similarly, attack -has been made on the Illinois provision. Formerly, a "rule of one" 
was applied to state civil service jobs by Ill. Laws 1943, at 449, § 1, but this was 
amended to a "rule of three" by Ill. Laws 1945, at 529, § 1. At present there are no civil 
service statutes covering Illinois state employees generally. But cf. ILL. REv. STAT, ch. 
24½, §§ 38bl-m (1963), providing a University Civil Service System covering employ-
ment with state universities. Under this act a "rule of three" has been adopted. ILL. 
REv. STAT. ch. 24½, § 38b7 (1963). However, the "rule of one" has been retained in 
local civil service appointments by the recently enacted Illinois Municipal Code. Ill. 
Laws 1961, at 870, § 10-1-14 (now ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-14 (1963)). 
37. ALA. CODE APP. § 1222 (1958); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-6204, -6244, 0 6253 (1963); 
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of municipal discretion in local employment decisions,88 but impose 
this absolute preference in order to avoid any undesirable local in-
fluence on these appointments because of the overriding state in-
terest in preserving public safety and welfare.39 Despite the existence 
of an absolute preference, some discretion· is retained subsequent to 
the appointment; most statutes furnish a probationary period of em-
ployment during which the appointee must demonstrate his actual 
merit and capabilities.40 
Although this type of absolute preference is generally imposed 
only upon municipalities, a few state civil service systems contain an 
implied preference for the person standing highest _on the list of 
qualified applican~.41 This preference is effectuated by providing an 
opportunity for review by the civil service commission of the validity 
of the appointment. The appointing authority is required to provide 
the commission with "good reason" for passing over any applicant 
with a higher examination score than the appointee. Since these 
reasons are not only subject to review by the commission but also 
open to public inspection, there is a definite pressure to appoint the 
person standing highest on the list.42 
B. Preference for the Last Remaining Applicant on the List 
Because small municipal working forces generally result in a 
slow turnover of civil service jobs, lists of eligible applicants are 
infrequently used in small communities. As a result, many eligible 
applicants find work elsewhere before being certified for appoint-
M1cH. COMP. LAws § 38.511 (Supp. 1961); NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-1810 (1962); OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. § 143.344 (Page Supp. 1964); TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (1963); 
WASH, REv. CODE §§ 41.08.100, 41.12.100 (1958). 
38. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text. 
39, See State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 409-10, 21 N.E. 252, 261-62 
(1889); Ice, Municipal Home Rule in Indiana, 17 IND. L.J. 375, 392 (1942). 
40. The Nebraska statute seems to go so far as to equate the probation period with 
appointive discretion by specifically providing a three to six month probation period 
"to enable the appointing power to exercise a choice in the filling of positions." NEB. 
REv. STAT, § 19-1810 (1963). Other states generally provide a probation period for all 
appointments. See, e.g., ALA. CODE APP. § 662 (1958) (12 months); !LL. REv. STAT, ch. 24, 
§ 10-1-14 (1963) (not to exceed 6 months); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 143.20 (Page Supp. 
1964) (not less than 2 nor more than 12 months); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53266 (1957) 
(6 months). See Kaplan, Let's Look at Civil Service!, 33 NAT'L MuNIC. REv. 441, 444 
(1944), arguing that probationary employment is the best means of exercising discretion 
and should be utilized to full advantage. 
41. N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 11-10·6.1 (Supp. 1947). See also IOWA STAT. § 70.3 (1962); MASS. 
GEN. LAws ANN, ch. 31, § 15 (Supp. 1964); MINN. STAT. § 43.30 (1961) (state employees); 
TENN, CODE ANN. § 8-3210 (1956) (implied preference for veterans). 
42. One obvious interpretative difficulty with this procedure involves the problem 
of whether the "good reason" requirement contemplates a reasonable belief, or merely 
a good faith belief, that the higher-scoring applicant is not in fact the better qualified. 
The allocation of the burden of proof, as between the rejected applicant and the 
appointing authority, is another source of uncertainty. See notes 80-84 infra and ac-
companying text. 
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ment. Thus, when a vacancy occurs, there may be only one qualified 
applicant still available. This situation often results in the applica-
tion of a second type of absolute preference. Five states have statutes 
which require the appointment of this last remaining qualified appli-
cant,43 while other states have required it by judicial construction of 
their civil service laws.44 
Such a preference does not compromise the quality of civil service 
personnel, since the applicant has proved himself qualified by achiev-
ing his position on the list.45 Furthermore, since the use of this pref-
erence has been restricted to municipal civil service appointments,40 
its infringement of the appointing authority's discretion can be justi-
fied by the desirability of avoiding the delay and expense of conduct-
ing another examination. This is especially desirable in the case of 
municipalities because the burdens of a vacancy on a small staff and 
the expense of holding an examination are proportionately greater 
for a local government than for the state.47 
This preference is not restricted to the situation in which all but 
one eligible applicant have become unavailable, but also applies 
where all but one eligible applicant have been appointed to fill 
earlier vacancies. The statutes provide generally for the maximum 
utilization of the eligible lists.48 Thus, the same list may be used for 
certification each time a vacancy occurs, with no new examination 
being held until the list is exhausted.49 The preference is therefore 
rationalized primarily as a matter of convenience whereby vacancies 
are filled promptly with an infrequent and slight sacrifice of muni-
cipal discretion and a substantial saving of expense. 
43. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-209 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-2297 (1949); LA. 
REv. STAT. § 33-2416 (1950); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-28-9 (1953); see KY. REv. STAT. § 
90.170 (1962) (discussed nqte 70 infra). See also Wyo. Laws 1965, ch. 112, § 289, deleting 
a similar provision from Wyo. Laws 1937, ch. 69, § 9 (now Wvo. STAT. § 15.1-289 (1965)). 
44. E.g., Jenkins v. Gronen, 98 Wash. 128, 167 Pac. 916 (1917); cf. Gottlieb v. 
Kryzan, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 157 N.E.2d 886 (1958). See note 70 infra. 
45. It has been held that all applicants certified are equally qualified for appoint• 
ment. State ex rel. Raines v. Seattle, 134 Wash. 360, 235 Pac. 968 (1925). Nevertheless, 
numerous states have specifically precluded the appointing authority from being com• 
pelled to appoint without having a choice of applicants. Sec notes 25-28 supra and ac• 
companying text. 
46. Sec authorities cited notes 43-44 supra. 
47. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 225; Kaplan, supra note 40, at 445. 
48. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-2297 (1949): "[W]hcncver the eligible list 
of the civil service commission contains less than double the number of applicants to 
fill the vacancy or vacancies existing, the board of commissioners shall appoint the 
person or persons then available on said eligible list." 
49. The list will n()t necessarily be exhausted in every case. Because of the limit 
on the duration of the validity of such lists (see note 20 supra) the list will frequently 
become invalid before it is exhausted. Also, the civil service commission is sometimes 
authorized to hold new examinations to supplement an existing valid list, thereby 
preventing depletion of the list. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-209 (1947). 
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C. The Veterans' Preference 
The absolute preference is most commonly utilized as a means of 
preferring veterans for public employment.50 Since this preference 
grants special treatment to a particular class of persons, it presents a 
constitutional problem under the privileges and immunities clause.51 
However, since the veteran is required to pass the civil service ex-
amination52 as a prerequisite to being preferred for appointment,53 
the preference is upheld, being rationalized as a valid recognition 
of traits developed by military service, which, although not mea-
surable by examination, tend to make capable veterans good public 
servants. 54 
Many states have enabled veterans to acquire public employment 
more easily, and have nonetheless avoided any infringement upon 
the discretion of the appointing authority, by employing so-called 
point preferences.55 In these states the veteran is granted a certain 
50. FLA. STAT, §§ 295.07, .10 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 65-502 (Supp. 1963); IND. 
ANN. STAT. § 60-1319 (1961) (state only); IOWA CODE §§ 70.1, 365.10 (1962); KAN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 73.201 (Supp. 1961); LA. REv. STAT. § 33:2416 (1950); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 
64A, §§ 17-18 (1957); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, §§ 23, 23B, 25 (1961); MICH. COMP. 
LAws § 35.401 (Supp. 1961); MINN. STAT. § 197.45 (1961); MoNT. REv. CooES ANN. § 77-
501 (1955); NEV. REv. STAT. § 281.060 (1963) (state only); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 283.4 
(1955); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 11:27-3, -5 (Supp. 1947), § 11:271, (Supp. 1952); N.D. 
CENT. CooE § 37-19-01 (1960); Omo REv. CooE ANN. § 143.20 (Page Supp. 1964); ORE. 
REV. STAT, § 408.220 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.4 (1954); WASH. REv. CODE 
§ 73.16.010 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-119 (1957). 
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
52. It bas frequently been held that it is unconstitutional to permit a lower passing 
grade for veterans. Cook v. Mason, 103 Cal. App. 6, 283 Pac. 891 (1929); Matter of 
Keymer, 148 N.Y. 219, 42 N.E. 667 (1896); Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 
333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701 (1938) (dictum). Under such a holding, all persons must meet 
the same prescribed minimum standard (see note 15 supra) before any preference can 
be applied. But see note 56 infra and accompanying text. 
53. An exception to the requirement that a veteran must pass the civil service 
examination is provided in MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 22 (1961), which authorizes 
the appointing authority to appoint a medal of honor winner without examination. 
This is somewhat ironic since the landmark case requiring that veterans pass the 
examination was a Massachusetts decision. Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N.E. 
1005 (1896). 
54. It has been said that characteristics of discipline, experience, loyalty, and public 
spirit developed by military service tend to make veterans valuable public servants. 
Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382 (1951); Common-
wealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701 (1938). But see Weintraub &: 
Tough, Veterans Preferred, Unlimited, 34 NAT'L MuNrc. REv. 437 (1945). These writers 
attack such preferences as based entirely on the sentimental desire of civilians to reward 
those who risked their lives for the war effort. They further suggest that a pervasive 
veterans' preference will undermine the basic competitive merit system of employment. 
55. Connecticut is perhaps the clearest example of a state consciously avoiding any 
infringement on local choice by the use of point preferences. The statute initially 
provides that the appointing authority shall always have a choice of three eligibles. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 5-38 (Supp. 1963). See note 25 supra and accompanying text. It 
then provides that a veteran's preference shall be effectuated only by the addition of 
extra points to the earned passing score. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-415 (Supp. 1963). 
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number of points to be added to his earned score66 to determine his 
position on the list of eligible applicants, and the appointing au-
thority is left free to choose from among a limited number of the top 
eligible applicants. Thus, the point preference results in an earlier 
consideration of the veteran for employment. 
In those states invoking an absolute preference in favor of vet-
erans, the mechanics of the process vary. Statutes embodying an abso-
lute preference for veterans commonly entitle honorably discharged 
veterans57 to preference in appointment and employment.68 Such 
statutes present an interpretative question as to the proper method 
of effectuating the preference. The preference may mean that all 
qualified veterans shall be appointed before any nonveterans are 
appointed, 59 or it may simply mean that the veteran is preferred if he 
is among those in the top group on the list who are actually certi-
fied. 60 Various factors are considered in resolving this interpretative 
question. If there is an applicable point-preference statute in addi-
tion to the absolute preference statute, it is generally reasoned that 
the point preferences are meant to improve the veteran's position in 
order to increase his opportunity of being certified; thus, the absolute 
New York similarly limits veterans' preferences to the addition of points. N.Y. CIV, 
SERV. LAW § 85. 
56. Most states allow the preference points to be added only to an actual passing 
score. E.g., COLO. CoNsr. art. XII, § 14; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-415 (1963); FLA. 
STAT. § 295.08 (1963); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 3-81 (1955); KAN. GEN, STAT, ANN, § 75-2955 
(Supp. 1961); LA. REv. STAT, § 33:2416 (1950); N.Y. CIV. SERV, LAW § 85; R.I. GEN, LAWS 
ANN. § 36-4-19 (1956). However, Minnesota and Maryland specifically provide that point 
preferences may be added to enable a veteran to achieve a passing score. MINN, STAT, 
§ 43.30 (1957): MD. ANN. CODE art. 64, § 18 (1957). Certain other states do not specifically 
require that the veteran meet the minimum standard before the preference points arc 
added, but seem to allow the preference points to be added to enable the veteran to 
pass. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 38.413 (Supp. 1961); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 77-501 
(1955); NEB. REv. STAT, § 19-1804(3) (1962). 
57. The specific veterans preferred vary from state to state. IowA CODE § 365.10 
(1962) (honorably discharged veterans); KAN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 73•201 (Supp, 1961) 
(veterans of military operations); N.D. CENT, CODE§ 37-19-01 (1960) (veterans of wartime 
meeting certain pre-induction state residence requirements); WASH. REv. Com; § 
73.16.010 (1958) (veterans who have been awarded a campaign ribbon). 
58. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 73-201 (Supp. 1961); Mn. ANN, CODE art. 64A, §§ 17, 18 
(1957); MICH. COMP. LAws § 35.401 (Supp. 1961); MINN. STAT. § 197.45 (1961); MONT. 
REv. CODES ANN, § 77-501 (1955); ORE. REY. STAT. § 408.220 (1963); WASH, REV, CODE 
§ 73.16.010 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-119 (1957). See also FLA. STAT. § 295,07 (1963): 
LA. REV. STAT. § 33:2416 (1950); N.H. REV. STAT, ANN. § 283:4 (1955); N.D. CENT, CODE 
§ 37-19-01 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.4 (1954). 
59. N.J. REY. STAT. §§ 11:27-3, -5 (Supp. 1947) provides that veterans shall be placed 
ahead of all nonveterans on the eligibility list. N.J. REv. STAT. § 11:27-4 (Supp. 1952) 
provides all veterans shall be appointed before any nonveterans. Similarly, all veterans 
are appointed before any nonveterans under KAN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 73-201 (Supp. 1961), 
See also Mn. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 18 (1957) (veterans shall be certified before non• 
veterans). 
60. IowA ConE § 365.10 (1962), as interpreted in Zanfes v. Olson, 232 Iowa 1169, 7 
N.W.2d 901 (1943); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 143.20 (Page Supp. 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
51, § 492.4 (1954). See also Herman v. Sturgeon, 228 Iowa 829, 293 N.W. 488 (1940) 
(preference allowed under IowA ConE § 70.1 (1962) to veteran certified at top of list). 
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preference is deemed to apply .only to those certified.61 Similarly, a 
mandatory procedural requirement that the names of the persons 
with the three highest test scores be certified may imply that the 
absolute preference applies only to those certified.62 On the other 
hand, where the statute in some way requires a separate listing of all 
veterans, it may be inferred that all veterans are to be appointed be-
fore any non-veteran is appointed. 63 
Another type of absolute preference granted to veterans requires · 
the appointment of a disabled veteran who passes the examination 
and is physically capable of performing the job.64 Under a final type 
of absolute preference for veterans, if a veteran and a nonveteran 
have identical examination scores the veteran must be appointed in 
preference to the nonveteran.65 Thus, a veteran is absolutely entitled 
to appointment if his score (his actual earned score plus any pref-
erence points allowable under state law)66 is equal to the highest 
score and he is the only veteran certified. 
Ill. ENFORCEMENT OF .ABSOLUTE PREFERENCES 
A. Judicial Enforcement 
Because of the policy of promoting municipal discretion in the 
appointment process, most state legislatures have refrained from 
imposing any framework for examining the propriety of appoint-
ments or for enforcing statutory preferences. As a result, it is some-
times possible for appointing authorities to ignore absolute prefer-
ences because of the lack of a readily available method of compelling 
compliance with the statutory requirement. Furthermore, the courts 
have failed to assume responsibility for enforcing preferences. Some 
61. Thus PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.4 (1954), when read in conjunction with PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.3 (1951), results in a preference of a veteran if he has one of 
the three highest examination scores after the addition of his preference points. If 
he were the only veteran certified in the top three, it would be an absolute preference. 
62. IowA CODE § 365.10 (1962) (ten highest); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.4 (1954). 
See note 60 supra. 
63. N.J. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 11:27-3, -5 (Supp. 1947) and N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 11:27-4 (Supp. 
1952) entitle all veterans to be appointed before nonveterans by setting up eligibility 
lists according to such classifications. See notes 49 and 59 supra. Similarly, in Valen-
tine v. Redford Twp. Supervisor, 371 Mich. 138, 123 N.W.2d 227 (1963), the require-
ment that veterans be listed separately was deemed evidence of a legislative intent to 
accord them preference rights above all nonveterans. 
64. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 65-502 (Supp. 1965); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 
(1961); N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 11:27-3 (Supp. 1947), § 11:27-4 (Supp. 1952). See Smith v. 
Director of Civil Service, 324 Mass. 455, 87 N.E.2d 196 (1949), upholding the validity of 
the superior preference for disabled veterans. For a decision limiting its application 
by allowing a disqualification of the disabled veteran due to his disability, see Hayes 
v. Hurley, 292 Mass. 109, 197 N.E. 471 (1935). 
65. IOWA CODE § 70.l (1962); NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 281.060 (1963); OHIO R.Ev. CODE ANN. 
§ 143.20 (Page Supp. 1964); see Herman v. Sturgeon, 228 Iowa 829, 293 N.W. 488 (1940). 
66. State ex rel. King v. Emmons, 128 Ohio St. 216, 190 N.E. 468 (1934). But see 
Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 132 (1944). 
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courts presented with complaints alleging wrongful failure to ap-
point have obviated a consideration of the absolute preference right 
by finding that the appointing authority refused to appoint the pre-
ferred applicant because he was not qualified, 67 and that the refusal 
was a lawful exercise of municipal discretion.68 By treating the action 
as a valid exercise of discretion, courts have rendered the appointing 
authority immune from judicial scrutiny absent a showing of fraud, 
bad faith, arbitrariness, or capriciousness.69 Other courts have 
enabled municipalities to evade enforcement of absolute preferences 
by flatly requiring that the appointing authority be provided a 
choice of applicants in all instances.70 
Although such holdings deny enforcement of rights which state 
legislatures have attempted to accord, the disinclination of the courts 
to order appointments can be explained in part by the courts' reluc-
tance to become involved in a potentially continuing controversy 
generated by the appointing authority's initial dislike for the pre-
ferred applicant. For example, if the appointment were ordered, the 
appointee might subsequently complain of being given an undesir-
67. The most obvious example of a person who is unqualified to fill the vacancy 
despite being entitled to an absolute preference is a disabled veteran who is physically 
unable to meet the demands made by the available job. Such a case is recognized in 
some state statutes, and discretion is allowed for determining whether the appointment 
should be made. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (1962). See note 64 supra and 
accompanying text. However, other states have specifically prohibited such discretion 
where absolute preferences are involved, by providing that the appointing authority 
shall only be entitled to exercise choice by means of a probation period of employment 
for all applicants. E.g., NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 19-1810 (1963). See note 40 supra and ac-
companying text. 
68. The range of lawful discretion is potentially very extensive. In Patterson v. 
Boron, 153 Mich. 313, 116 N.W. 1083 (1908), the court refused to infringe upon the dis-
cretion of the appointing authority and order the appointment of a veteran because 
in the appointing authority's best judgment relator was not competent. Thus, the court 
required only a good faith exercise of discretion. See also Boyer v. City of Creston, 
113 N.W. 474 (Iowa 1907); Ross v. City Council of Sioux City, 136 Iowa 125, 113 N.W. 
474 (1907). California, Illinois, and New Jersey are apparently the only states which 
"will grant a review 'in the nature of a trial' on both the facts and the law." CARPENTER, 
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFOR!II 122 (1952), 
69. Quintin v. Edwards, 40 Mont. 287, 106 Pac. 695 (1910); sec Townsend v. McCall, 
262 Ala. 554, 80 So. 2d 262 (1955); Bums v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 
273 P.d 605 (1954); City of Philadelphia v. T.B. Rice 8: Sons Co., 274 Pa. 256, 118 AU. 
14 (1922). 
70. Seward v. Kratt, 129 Ohio St. 296, 195 N.E. 241 (1935). Sec also Neal v. Williams, 
285 Ky. 753, 149 S.W.2d 516 (1941). The Seward case is consistent with the earlier cited 
case of Gottlieb v. Kryzan, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 157 N.E.2d 886 (1958) (sec note 44 
supra), in that both looked to the mandatory requirement that three names be certified 
to enable the appointing authority to exercise some discretion. Although withdrawals 
by two applicants in Gottlieb may have in fact deprived the appointing authority of 
his choice, the statutory provisions requiring that discretion be allowed had been met, 
and that was considered sufficient to require the appointment. The Neal case, on the 
other hand, was overrnled on its facts by KY. REv. STAT. § 90.170 (1962), This statute, 
which was enacted the year after the Neal decision (Ky. Laws 1942, ch. 16, § 4), pro-
vides that appointments shall be made from eligible lists until they are exhausted or 
replaced. 
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able assignment as a result of discrimination by the authority who 
was reluctant to appoint him in the first instance. Similarly, the 
court might find itself facing the same controversy if the appointee 
were subsequently dismissed for cause and complained of unfair treat-
ment. Nevertheless, such considerations should not automatically 
preclude judicial involvement in the appointment process, since 
civil service commissions are generally empowered to hear employee 
grievances regarding reductions in rank or wrongful dismissals.71 
Furthermore, courts have not hesitated to prevent arbitrary dismis-
sals, but have compelled the retention of employees in such cases.72 
A novel example of judicial reluctance to effectuate absolute 
preferences fully is the recent Pennsylvania case of Bobick v. Fitz-
gerald.73 An applicant entitled to an absolute preference as a vet-
eran74 was passed over in favor of another applicant for a vacant 
position on the police force. The rejected applicant sought by way 
of mandamus to have the court compel his appointment. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, in a three-to-three affirmance of the lower 
court, stated that it was powerless to compel the appointment. The 
refusal to issue the writ of mandamus was somewhat striking, be-
cause an earlier Pennsylvania decision75 had held that an absolute 
preference for veterans76 was .mandatory and had ordered an appoint-
ment. 77 However, in Bobick the court felt that mandamus should 
not issue because a judicial order requiring the appointment would 
in effect make the court the appointing body, thus usurping the 
borough council's statutory power of appointment,78 and infringihg 
its discretionary authority to execute that power.79 
71. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT, ch, 24, § 10-1-18 (1963); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 38.416 (1948); 
N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw § 75; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 53270 (1957). 
72. E.g., Mafera v. Pasta, 265 N.Y. 552, 193 N.E. 316 (1934); Smith v. Rowland, 353 
Pa. 142, 44 A.2d 575 (1946). See also Nuttall v. Simis, 31 App. Div. 503, 52 N.Y.S. 308 
(1898). 
73. 416 Pa. 588, 207 A.2d 878 (1965). 
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492:4 (1957). The Pennsylvania civil service system under 
which this case was decided is described in text accompanying notes 10-21 supra. 
75. Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701 (1938). See 
also Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 46 Pa. D. &: C. 397, 90 P.L.J. 653 (1942). 
76. The preference statute involved was Pa. Laws 1931, § 4407, at 1113, which pro-
vided "preference in appointment shall be given" veterans. The present act, PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 51, § 492.4 (1957), provides that the "appointing ••• power in making an 
appointment ••• shall give preference" to veterans. 
77. In a unique interpretation, the Pennsylvania court has determined that prefer-
ences for appointments are constitutional, but those for promotions are not. Common-
wealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382 (1951). This doctrine has 
been expressly rejected in Connecticut and Massachusetts. See State ex rel. Higgins 
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 139 Conn. 102, 90 A.2d 862 (1952); McNamara v. Director of 
Civil Service, 330 Mass. 22, 110 N.E.2d 840 (1953). 
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13201 (1957). 
79. Since .the decision is discretionary, the appointing authority's determination is 
deemed valid absent fraud, bad faith, or an arbitrary or capricious action. See note 69 
supra and accompanying text. Courts will refuse to issue a mandamus order if there is 
room for the exercise of discretion by the appointing authority, Shaw v. Marshalltown, 
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In answer to the foregoing reasoning, the dissenting judges 
argued that the borough council had exercised its full discretion in 
appointing the wrong man, and, having decided to make an appoint-
ment, should be compelled to make the lawful appointment.80 The 
dissenting view thus would not limit't:he discretion of the council in 
determining when to make appointments, but would eliminate its 
choice of whom to appoint. The majority felt, however, that the 
council should be entitled to consider whom they would be obli-
gated to appoint in the process of deciding whether any appointment 
would be made. 
The court attempted, through the use of an equitable enforce-
ment remedy, to balance the applicant's right to a preference and the 
desire to preserve discretion in the appointing authority. While hold-
ing that it was powerless to compel the appointment, the court stated 
that Bobick's absolute preference right made him the only person 
who could lawfully be appointed. 81 Thus the court in Bobick held, 
in effect, that the court could not compel the appointment of the 
petitioner, but would interfere in the appointment process to pre-
vent unlawful appointments. The weakness of this solution, of 
course, is that it does not necessarily lead to the effectuation of the 
policy of the preference, since the appointing authority can avoid 
appointment of the preferred applicant by leaving the vacancy un-
filled. Furthermore, this equitable device had no effect whatever in 
Bobick, since it prevented the appointment of other applicants only 
so long as Bobick remained among the top three on the current eligi-
bility list, and his claim to the position had already expired with the 
passing of the one-year period of valiflity of the eligibility list. 82 
131 Iowa 128, 104 N.W. 1121 (1906), or if another applicant has already acceded to the 
office under a claim of right, State ex rel. Gallagher v. Kansas City, 319 Mo. 705, 7 
S.W.2d 357 (1928). Thus, issuance of mandamus to compel appointment has been limited 
to situations where the petitioner has an uncontested right to appointment. However, 
one acquires no legal rights by an improper appointment. Palmer v. Board of Educ., 
276 N.Y. 222, 11 N.E.2d 887 (1937); Manning v. Milbourne Borough Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 387 Pa. 176, 127 A.2d 599 (1957). Therefore, since the borough council's first 
appointment in Babick was unlawful and only the petitioner could lawfully be ap• 
pointed, his claim was uncontested, and his claim for mandamus could not be sum• 
marily dismissed. 
80. The dissenters explained their position by analogy to an election, arguing that 
since the council had voted to fill the police vacancy and the person with the most 
votes was unable to accept the position, the person receiving the second most votes 
(petitioner) was elected. 
81. It should be noted that if the court were faced with a situation in which it 
could issue an effective injunction prohibiting the appointment of anyone but the 
petitioner, it might hesitate to do so if the appointing authority raised the petitioner's 
qualifications as a defense, alleging that in its judgment he was not qualified. Sec note 
68 supra and accompanying text. 
82. Since the applicable statute provides eligibility lists shall be valid for one year 
{PA. STAT • .ANN. tit. 53, § 53264 (1957)), the appointing authority is entitled to a new 
list from which to appoint if it delays for one year. In the Babick case, the delay 
caused by the legal proceedings had been four years. Of course, Bobick can again take 
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With a valid injunction outstanding preventing the appointment 
of anyone but the petitioner, an action might be brought by a third-
party taxpayer to compel an appointment of a policeman in the in-
terest of the public health, safety, and welfare. However, since the 
decision not to appoint a policeman was an exercise of the borough 
council's discretion, the complainant would have the nearly impos-
sible task of proving bad faith in the borough council's decision.83 
Thus, the courts have been hesitant to enforce the rights of pre-
ferred applicants in the face of the policy of retaining municipal 
discretion, and unsuccessful in their effort to balance the competing 
equities. As a result, it would seem that the state legislatures must 
attempt to devise an effective means of enforcing absolute preferences 
without undue infringement upon the legitimate exercise of dis-
cretion by the appoiI].ting authority.84 
B. Statutory Enforcement Procedures 
A basic statutory method of compelling compliance with prefer-
ence provisions may be foun4 in the statutes of several states 
requiring general compliance. with civil service provisions. Under 
most such statutes, a willful violation of the civil service laws is a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine and imprisonment. 85 A common 
additional sanction is to bar the violator from any position in the 
civil service for a certain period, generally five years. 86 Another 
means of inducing compliance with appointment procedures is to 
subject the willful violator to liability for the damages caused by his 
violation. 87 The measure of damages is the wages which were im-
properly paid to the person unlawfully appointed or which should 
have been paid the neglected applicant. 
Despite their deterrent potential, such sanctions have seldom 
effectuated appointments required by absolute preference laws, be-
the examination, but unless he is again the only veteran to place among the top three 
he will not be entitled to an absolute preference. The result of the court's holding 
is truly incongruous when it is noted that the appointing authority, despite requesting 
an examination to enable it to make an appointment, never appointed anyone who 
qualified on that examination. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra for a discus-
sion of the statute in question. 
83. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
84. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. 
85. E.g., Aruz. REv. STAT • .ANN. § 38-494 (1956); FLA. STAT. § 110.14 (1963); l\fASS. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 51 (1961); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 38.423 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 43.35 
(1961); NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-1822 (1962); Omo REv. CODE .ANN. § 143.99 (Page 1953); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 819 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. § 240.990 (1963). 
86, E.g., FLA. STAT, § 110.14 (1963); MINN. STAT, § 43.35 (1961); OKLA, STAT. tit. 74, 
§ 819 (1961). See also N.Y. CIV. SERv, LAw § 108, which provides for loss of job upon 
violation of provisions of the act and reemployment only on terms of a :five-year 
probation period "during which period he shall serve without tenure and at the 
pleasure of the appointing officer or body." 
87. E.g., COLO, REv. STAT . .ANN. § 26-5-27 (1963); N.J. REv. STAT. § 11:21-2 (Supp. 
1954); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 95; R.I. GEN. LAws .ANN. § 36-4-49 (1956). 
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cause few states have imposed on the appointing authority an affir-
mative duty to appoint the person entitled to an absolute preference. 
Furthermore, states have failed to provide the preferred applicant 
with the means to compel his appointment; indeed, it was this prob-
lem that occasioned the anomalous result in the Bobick case. These 
fundamental weaknesses in the preference system could be at least 
partially eliminated by laws imposing a duty on appointing authori-
ties to fill existing vacancies.88 It is arguable that an applicant who 
could demonstrate the existence of a vacancy for which he was quali-
fied, the duty of the authority to make an appointment to fill the 
vacancy, and the existence of an absolute preference in his favor, 
would be entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling his appoint-
ment, since no element of discretion would remain in the appointing 
authority.89 However, the appointing authority could set up a 
defense to the mandamus action by alleging that it should be allowed 
to produce evidence that the preferred applicant is unqualified for 
the job.90 
On the other hand, this procedure could be nullified if the term 
"vacancy" is not carefully defined by statute, since the appointing 
authority could simply refuse to make an appointment on the basis 
of his individual determination that a vacancy does not exist. Some 
statutes attempt to define "vacancy" in terms of specific causes. For 
example, the North Dakota statute provides that a vacancy exists 
when the term of an incumbent expires due to death, resignation, 
dismissal for cause, or expiration of the tenure of the appointment,01 
but may be inadequate because of its failure to provide for the exis-
tence. of a vacancy due to the authorization of a new position. Fur-
thermore, it would appear unwise to require an appointment every 
time a position becomes unoccupied, since the departure of an em-
ployee creates an ideal situation to satisfy a need to decrease the size 
of the work force. Thus, a more reasonable approach would be to 
define a vacancy as existing whenever the appointing authority re-
quests a certification of persons eligible for appointment, and to 
establish an affirmative requirement that an appointment be made 
to fill each vacancy thus defined. Under this approach, the appointing 
authority, whose decision to make an appointment would become 
88. Cf. IOWA CODE § 70.3 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 197.45 (1961); N.D, CENT, CODE §§ 
37-19-01, -02 (1960). Compare IDAHO CODE ANN. § 65.504 (Supp. 1965) and WYO. STAT, 
§ 19-120 (1957), providing an affirmative duty to appoint preferred applicants. 
89. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
90. Other provisions of some interest which aim at attaining compliance with civil 
service laws but fail to provide any power to compel appointments are FLA. STAT. § 
295.11 (1963) (authorizing the State Veterans Commission to do all in its power to aid 
a veteran who has been denied his preference rights); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 25 
(granting the state civil service commission power to review and amend local civil 
service rules to effectuate state employment policies). One writer has interpreted the 
Florida provision as authorizing only an investigation. 34 FLA. Jua. 'Veterans§ 10 (1961). 
91. N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-19-02 (1960). 
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irrevocable when he requested the certification, could not, upon 
discovering the identity of an absolutely preferred applicant, frus-
trate the operation of that preference by leaving the position unfilled. 
Several states have avoided the problem- of judicial reluctance to 
interfere with municipal discretion in making appointments by estab-
lishing a statutory framework requiring courts to enforce preferences. 
Statutes in three states specifically authorize the use of mandamus 
to compel municipal appointments.92 A similar statutory enforce-
ment procedure provides a prompt hearing in the state district court 
to any person who believes he has wrongfully been denied appoint-
ment.93 The district court, on the basis of the petitioner's allegation 
of facts justifying an absolute preference, may order the appointing 
authority to appear within five to ten days and show cause why the 
petitioner should not be appointed. Upon a failure to show adequate 
cause, the court may order the appointment of the petitioner. 
Other states have honored the judicial desire to remain aloof 
from appointment controversies, but have provided administrative 
means of protecting an applicant's statutory preference rights. These 
statutes commonly authorize the municipal civil service commission 
merely to investigate the enforcement of or compliance with civil 
service regulations. 94 Although these provisions grant the civil service 
commission substantial powers, including the power of subpoena95 
and the authority to advise a dismissal of the appointing officer on the 
basis of its findings, 96 the commission is still left powerless to compel 
an appointment. Thus, upon a finding by the commission of non-
compliance with an absolute preference requirement, actual enforce-
ment depends upon the availability of a court remedy or the induce-
ment of voluntary compliance by persuasion.97 
Although the means provided by states to enforce absolute prefer-
ences at the municipal level have been generally ineffective, more 
meaningful measures have been provided for appointments at the -
state level. For instance, in Indiana the state civil service commission 
is required to pass upon the sufficiency of the reasons put forth by 
92. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 65.505 (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE § 70.4 (1962); MINN. STAT. 
§ 197.46 (1957). 
93. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 77-501 (1955); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-19-04 (1960). 
These statutes enforce an absolute preference for veterans. 
94. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 38.412, .420 (Supp. 1961); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 143.40 
(Page Supp. 1964); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 242.420, .726 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 
12625, 53258 (1957). 
95. MICH. COMP. LAws § 38.422 (1948); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 242.420, .728 (1959); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 53259, 12625 (1957). 
96. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 143.40 (Page Supp. 1964). 
97. Some states authorize the civil service commission to prosecute all actions aimed 
at enforcing civil service laws. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-1814 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 53, § 12646 (1957). In th<: absence of such a provision, however, the burden of 
seeking enforcement of the absolute preference may fall entirely upon the aggrieved 
~~~. , . 
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the appointing authority for passing over a veteran eligible for a 
preference, and to notify the appointing officer of its finding.98 In 
addition, criminal sanctions may be imposed in Indiana for non-
compliance with the absolute preference law.99 This combination of 
commission review and the threat of criminal sanctions would appear 
to be sufficient in most cases to assure that proper appointments are 
made. However, here again, no means have been provided for ac-
tually compelling the appointment. Maryland, however, has pro-
gressed a step further than Indiana by authorizing the State Personnel 
Commissioner to nullify an appointment which he finds contrary 
to the preference statute and to order the required appointment.100 
The fact that these statutes apply exclusively to the state civil 
service system suggests that the administrative enforcement mecha-
nism might be unduly burdensome on a municipality. However, 
since municipal civil service commissions review wrongful dismissals 
of employees,101 it would appear that they also have the capacity to 
review improper appointments. Furthermore, where the state legis-
lature has adopted the absolute preference as a means of implement-
ing certain state policies, it would seem that individuals entitled to 
those rights should be afforded the opportunity to enforce them. 
In view of the judicial reluctance to assume immediate responsibility 
for protecting these rights, state legislatures must guarantee the effec-
tiveness of the objectives of the absolute preference provisions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that there has been, in some states, effective 
judicial enforcement of absolute preferences, an administrative en-
forcement mechanism would seem more desirable, in view of the 
widespread judicial reluctance to interfere with municipal discretion. 
It would seem that the appropriate mechanism to secure compliance 
with such preferences is the very body created to oversee them-the 
municipal civil service commission. The municipal appointing au-
thority should be required to submit to the commission his reasons 
for passing over a preferred applicant.102 The applicant should then 
be entitled to a hearing before the commission, which would be 
empowered to order the proper appointment if its findings were 
favorable to the complainant. This system would provide an efficient 
means of protecting statutory rights while preserving properly exer-
cised municipal discretion. In addition to the local hearing, there 
should be a system of appellate review by the state civil service com-
98. IND, ANN. STAT, § 60-1319 (1961). 
99. IND. ANN. STAT, § 60-1343 (1961). 
100. MD. ANN. Com:: art. 64A, § 17 (1957). 
101. See notes 9 and 71 supra and accompanying text. 
102. See notes 41-42, 98-100 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of similar 
procedures used at the state level. 
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mission or the courts, which could overturn any local commission's 
determination not supported by substantial evidence.103 
The effectuation of the policy of affording preferences to certain 
individuals will be greatly improved by increasing the control and 
influence of the municipal civil service commission over the appoint-
ment process. At the same time, such an increase in the role of the 
commission is a step in transforming that body from a mere testing 
service into a nonpolitical personnel department with general super-
visory powers over all municipal employment.104 
Thomas E. Swaney 
103. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 29.01-.02 (1959). 
104. See CARPENTER, THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 124-26 
(1952); Kaplan, Let's Look at Civil Seruice!, 33 NAT'L MUNIC. REv. 441 (1944). 
